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ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE HISTORIANS
STANLEY D. ROSE*

The year of 1957 was the 200th anniversary of the birth of Alexander
Hamilton-only he was really born in 1755.1 As befitted such a year,
a goodly number of books were put forth by hopeful publishers.
What follows will be, at least in part, an evaluation of some of these
books and their subject.**
But first, we ought to ask: Why more of the same? Why more books
on a man so well known? We only know the past through the eyes of
others. And strangely enough, different eyes see different things when
looking at the same subject. In Beveridge's Life of John Marshall,the
author deals very harshly with Thomas Jefferson. Ten years later
Beveridge wrote that if he were rewriting his great work he would not
be quite so positive in his criticism of Jefferson. 2 So even the same
eyes see differently at different times!
It has been said that each generation must retranslate the classics.
And, except in rare instances, each generation should probably redo
the biographies of its heroes and villains. The men of history have a
way of waxing and waning. Jefferson and Madison have been riding
high for the past few years. Their biographies have been redone and
done well. A new edition of Jefferson's papers is revealing hitherto unknown sides of the man. The same process should now be done on
Hamilton. The process should lead to a better understanding of this
*Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
**ALEXANDER HAMILTON, YOUTH TO MATURITY,

1755-1788. By Broadus Mitchell.

New York: The MacMillan Co., 1957. Pp. XVI, 675. $8.75.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON. By Nathan Schachner. New York: Thomas Yoseloff,
2d ed. 1957 [orig. pub. 1946]. Pp. VI, 488. $6.00.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION.

By Louis M. Hacker. New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957. Pp. XI, 273. $4.75.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION. Edited by Richard
B. Morris. New York: The Dial Press, 1957. Pp. XXI, 617. $7.50.
THE BASIC IDEAS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON. Edited by Richard B. Morris.
New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1957. Pp. XXVII, 457. 350

Edited by Margaret Esther Hall. New
York: Oceana Publications, 1957. Pp. 257. $1.00 paper, $3.50 cloth.

THE ALEXANDER HAMILTON READER.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON's PAPERS ON PUBLIC CREDIT COMMERCE AND FINANCE.

Edited by Samuel McKee, Jr. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957
[orig. pub. 1934]. Pp. XIV, 304. $1.25 paper, $3.50 cloth.

His LIFE, His Thought,
and His Style. Edited by Bower Aly. New York: The Liberal Arts Press,
1957. Pp. XVI, 261. $1.25 paper, $3.50 cloth..
HERITAGE FROM HAMILTON. By Broadus Mitchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. Pp. VIII, 160. $3.75
THE Mnm OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON. Edited by Saul K. Padover. New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1958, Pp. VI, 461. $6.50.
1. For a modern discussion of Hamilton's origins see MITCHELL, ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, YOUTH TO MATURITY, 1755-1788, c. 1 (1957). See also Bobbe,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, SELECTIONS REPRESENTING

The Boyhood of Alexander Hamilton, 6 AMER. HERITAGE 4 (1955).
2. BOwERS, BEVERIDGE AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 588 (1932).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11

extraordinary man. And understanding is what Hamilton needs more
than anything else. Since immediately after his death in 1804, biographies of Hamilton have been published at regular intervals. To
be blunt, none of them have been adequate.3 There seems to be a
continuing effort to preserve and use Hamilton as a symbol. The
result has not been history. To evaluate these new books on Hamilton,
it is necessary to look at the traditional view of Hamilton, test the
validity of this view, and then see where these new books stand with
respect to this traditional view.
Born on Nevis, one of the Leeward Islands in the West Indies,
Hamilton steps onto the American scene in 1775 as a precocious
pamphleteer in defense of the rights of the colonies. He became an
artillery battery commander in 1776. His first big opportunity came
when he was made Washington's aide. This position appeared "intolerable" by 1781 (visions of glory danced in his head) and he found
it possible to leave Washington's service. Washington bore him no
malice, and he finally achieved his desire. As a battalion commander,
he personally led a night assault on a British redoubt at Yorktown.
The war over, Hamilton now married into the prominent Schuyler
family, returned to New York, passed the New York bar, and, as he
began practicing, also became a member of the Continental Congress.
Early interested in finance, he worked to secure from the states the
power for Congress to levy an impost in order to secure a national
income. The effort failed by 1783 and he then began working for a
stronger union. He was instrumental in bringing on first the Annapolis convention and finally the Philadelphia convention in 1787 which
drafted the Constitution. He took virtually no part in the drafting
of the Constitution but was a substantial factor in its ratification
in New York. Appointed by Washington to be Secretary of the Treasury, he remained in that position until January of 1795. He then returned to his law practice in New York. He remained active in public
life, appearing in opposition to most of the issues and personalities of
the time. He was killed in a duel with Aaron Burr in 1804.
Hamilton's life spanned very important years in our history. With
his tremendous energy and ability he played a dominant role in national leadership through most of these years. His restless drive pushed
him into every corner of the new government and he got his way in
these early years to such an extent that the other members of the
early administrations of the United States were overshadowed. Thus
the tradition grew that Hamilton was the most important factor in the
establishment of a firm foundation for the new nation. This tradition
3. A great number of these prior biographies are examined in ALY, THE
His conclusion is "that no biographer has written a definitive account of Hamilton's life."
RHmToPJc OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1941).
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needs some qualification. The qualification would be in the direction
of showing that although Hamilton's policies were adopted at the
time, they were not the only policies available and many of these same
policies were actually abandoned within a few years after Hamilton's
retirement from the government.
Douglas Southall Freeman deliberately limited his account of
General Robert E. Lee's military operations to the information available to Lee at that time. He gave his readers virtually no idea of
what was going on in the minds of Lee's opponents. The unbalance
created by this practice is now apparent. Lee won or lost a battle
not only because of what he did but also because of what his opponent did or did not do. This observation is pertinent to the present
review. Hamilton's policies were affected by the reactions of his opponents. In fact he created his opponents. What Jefferson did and
thought is just as pertinent as what Hamilton did-when they were
clashing head on.
The books here being reviewed present a picture of Hamilton that
does not use all of the available evidence. In recent years some very
fine work has been done on the lives of Jefferson and Madison. 4 These
books when studied carefully present a view of Hamilton that cannot
be reconciled with the picture created by Hamilton's biographers.
This is not an unusual result in political controversy. But it is not
supposed to happen in historical writing. In this review I shall attempt to show the effect of applying some available evidence to the
traditional view of Hamilton and his policies.
In examining these policies, it is well to remember that they were
created for a particular time and place. They were aimed at solving
particular problems. Above all, in 1790 solutions had to be set
forth in the language of 1790. That language may use the same
words as we use today, but in many cases the meanings have changed.
A good example of this is the word "corruption." It is a term indicating evil today but it carried other connotations in the late eighteenth
century.
For instance, in David Hume's essay on the "Independence of Parliament," he discussed the consequences of the unlimited power of the
House of Commons. So far as Hume could see, the major check on
the abuse of power by the Commons lay in the great number of
offices and sinecures in the control of the crown. He said:
We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we please: we may
call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but
some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature
4. See, e.g., the multi-volume biographies by Dumas Malone and Irving
Brant.
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We should gee then that when Jefferson accuses Hamilton of
corrupting the Congress, he is using a concept that had a particular
meaning at that time. By using these words he conjured up visions
for his eighteenth century reader of monarchy, of executive effort
to unbalance the government by influencing the legislature, of unrest,
and potential civil war.
I suggest from this that some care should be used in setting forth
the intellectual milieu within which Hamilton moved, spoke, and
wrote. Hamilton's biographers have uniformly ignored this background. Disregarding an idea's relation to a particular time, they
have all too frequently tried to force Hamilton's views onto more
modern problems and the effort has not proven to be well-taken.
An example of the attempt to apply a Hamiltonian policy to a later
situation is to be found in the frequent modern references to Hamilton's use of the public debt as an instrument of national policy. This
policy has had only brief moments of favorable consideration in
American history. When Jefferson came into office in 1801, he immediately reversed this aspect of Hamilton's financial program. Jefferson and his Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, took as their
primary financial goal the reduction in the size of the public debt.
Henry Adams is alone among historians in noting that throughout the
great bulk of our history, the Gallatin financial system was the actual
practice of the government.6
Hamilton's theory enjoyed no further favor until 1933, when the
New Deal, influenced by Keynesian economics, called for measures
that required a substantial increase in the public debt. But a Hamiltonian increase in money capital is not the same as priming the pump
for a compensating economy. There is a superficial similarity between
Hamilton's efforts to cement the union by rallying all members of the
moneyed classes in support of it and the Keynesian effort to shore up
lagging investment and stave off the decelerating economic effects that
constitute a depression. Both policies require an increase in the
public debt. The problem is, however, a basically different one and
no amount of study of Hamilton's work will provide adequate guides
as to what to do for a stricken modern economy.
In seeking out the sources of Hamilton's ideas, we soon learn that
these sources are not readily discoverable. As Mitchell states:
5. Cited by Hamilton in Constitutional convention. Documents Illustrative
of the Formation of the Union, H. R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 261
(1927).

6. ADAMs, THE LIFE OF ALBERT GALLATn 175, 270 (1879). The Jeffersonian
theory was that prosperity could be left to the citizens without the intervention of the government.
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He rarely quoted an author or (except in legal briefs) cited the authority
of a writer in connection with a particular statement. Rather, the opinions which he owed to books, in whatever degree, were embedded and
diffused in his mind. They must be identified by fair inference, assisted
by his occasional mentions.7
However, I do not believe that the problem is really insuperable.
We gain one insight at the very outset of Hamilton's career from a set
of notes Hamilton kept in the paybook of his artillery company. 8 This
is actually a list of the books he had read and the subjects he considered in the years 1775-6. Another insight comes from his pamphlets
of 1775 which show his wide reading in the literature of the 18th
century in economics and government. If one starts with this same
background and then reads Hamilton's writings, a sense of familiarity
is met with almost at once. An example in the word "corruption" has
been given previously. A more extended example may be found in
the issue of the precise sources of Hamilton's views on the public
debt and banking. The handling of this problem in the books here
being reviewed will point up the problem.
Professor Hacker does not discuss the sources of Hamilton's views on
public debts but with respect to his views on banking states:
Not only had Hamilton familiarized himself with the history of banking, particularly that of the Bank of England, but he knew his Adam
Smith so well and leaned on him so closely-in both the Report on a
National Bank and the Report of Manufactures-that often he used
Smith's pattern of thought and sometimes Smith's very words. 9
In Schachner's discussion of the "Great Reports," it is stated that
Hamilton had no special training for his new duties as Secretary of the
Treasury but:
He had read widely on economic and financial problems and had studied
Adam Smith.10
Richard Morris states of Hamilton that:
He was familiar with the older European economists, the mercantilists
and the bullionists, and borrowed heavily from Postlethwayt, excerpts
from whose Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce are scattered
through his Army Pay Book. He also showed familiarity with Adam
Smith.11
Mitchell gives considerable space to the authorities mentioned in
the Pay Book and gives some suggestions on Hamilton's intellectual
7.

Mr CHELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 385.
8. Panagopoulos, Hamilton's Notes in His Pay Book of the New York State
Artillery Company, 62 AMER. HIST. REv. 310 (1957).

9.

10.
11.

HACKER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION 150

(1957).

ScHAcHNER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 242 (1957).
MORRIs, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION

(1957).

285
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origins. But all these writers give credit to Adam Smith and that poses
a real research problem. When did Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations
get to America?
The book was published in London in March of 1776. There is a
tradition that Benjamin Franklin discussed the draft with Smith in
Edinburgh. 2 This is doubted by a recent biographer of Franklin after
a careful study of Franklin's itinerary on that trip.13 In any event the

first American edition did not appear until 1789.14

James Madison mentions the book in a letter written to Jefferson
in 1785.15 In the collected works of Hamilton there is only one direct
quotation and that is under the date of 1792. By parallel passages, it
is impossible to doubt that Hamilton used the book in the preparation
6 But-Hamilton
of the Report on Manufactures.1
appears to have
developed his financial views by 1780. With the exception of the
policies set forth in the Report on Manufactures, all the ideas discussed in Hamilton's reports had been previously set forth by Robert
Morris and others.'7 As will be seen later, a debate had been going
on over these plans for over ten years and in virtually identical
language. Hamilton's sources had to be those he had mastered prior to
1780. Do we have evidence of Adam Smith's work in America prior
to 1780?
InDecember of 1781, the Confederation had chartered the first bank
in America-the Bank of North America of Philadelphia. Just one
year prior to this, James Wilson had written a prospectus for this
proposed bank. In this prospectus was the following paragraph:
The Bank of England acts not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great
engine of state. It has upon several different occasions supported the
credit of the principal houses, not only of England, but of Hamburgh
and Holland. On one occasion in 1763 .. ., it advanced in one week for
this purpose 1,600,000, a great part of it in bullion.18
The source of these words is obvious from the following quotation
on the Bank of England from The Wealth of Nations:
it acts, not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of state ....It
likewise discounts merchants bills, and has, upon several different occasions, supported the credit of the principal houses, not only of England,
12. 8 DICTIONARY or NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 3 (1885-1901).
13. NOLAN, BENJAIN FRANKLIN IN SCOTLAND AND IRELAND, 1759 AND 1771 at

200 (1938).

14. 7 EVANS, AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 361 (1903-34).
15. 2 WRITInGs OF MADISON 134 (Hunt ed.)

16. Bourne, Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith, 8 Q.J. EcON. 328 (1894).
17. One writer remarks that Hamilton's policies and Robert Morris' earlier
plans "were similar in every significant detail." He then complains about the
praise heaped on Hamilton and denied to Morris. VERSTEEG, ROBERT MORRIS,
REVOLUTIONARY FINANCIER

199 (1954).

18. Quoted in KoNKLE, THOMAS WILLING AND THE FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL

SYSTEM 97 (1937).
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but of Hamburgh and Holland. Upon one occasion, in 1763, it is said to
have advanced for this purpose, in one week, about 1,600,000, 1.; a great
part of it in bullion.19

Wilson and Hamilton were to know each other well. 20 But the above
quotation was written months after Hamilton's well-known letter to
Robert Morris.2 ' In this letter, written early in 1780, in a few brief
paragraphs Hamilton revealed that his background included a study
of European banking systems and an understanding of efforts to fund
public debts in France and England. All that he ever said later was
but an elaboration of his letters of 1780. Without detailing the proof,
let it be said here that the arguments preceding the founding of the
Bank of England in 1694 were virtually an exact parallel of those preceding the establishment of our own bank in 1790.22
The Bank of England had been a great and notorious success from
its very beginning. As noted previously, it had become a great engine
of state and was, for the times, the model of what a bank should be.
When the Bank of North America was chartered, Madison noted that
2
"it is pretty analogous in its principles to the Bank of England."
Wilson in the previously mentioned prospectus for the Bank of North
America made frequent references to the operation of the Bank of
England.24
It appears likely that Hamilton's convictions on financial matters were fixed long before he had a good look at Adam Smith. My
own vote as to the most important book in this connection is for
Postlethwayt's Dictionary.
But even if a direct connection between Smith and Hamilton prior
to 1780 could be established, a very plain obstacle still remains. From
1780 onwards Hamilton wished to fund the public debt. Smith has
an entire section decrying this very practice-this ruinous practice
of perpetual funding. He asserted that there is not an historical example of a nation fairly and completely paying off its debts. The
25
So
usual method of discharge of public debts is by bankruptcy.
19. SMTH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 304 (Mod. Libr. ed.).

20. "In his role of champion of the Bank of North America Wilson established himself as the country's leading apologist for a system of national finances based on a national bank. The relation between Wilson's
economic ideas and those later popularized by Alexander Hamilton is patent.
As though to symbolize the influence of the theories of Wilson on his younger
colleague, a copy of Wilson's plan for the Bank of North America, in his
own handwriting, lies among the Hamilton papers in the Library of Congress,
while the New Yorker's 'Plan for a National Bank,' in his hand, is among
Wilson's papers in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania." SIVUTH, JAMS WILsoN, FoUNDING FATHER, 1742-1790 at 158 (1956), reviewed in Nixon, Book Review, 10 VAm. L. REV. 164 (1956).
21. 1 WoRKs OF HAMITON 125 (Hamilton ed. 1851).
22. For the details see RosE, ALExANDER HAMILTON AND = PUBLic DEiBT
(unpublished thesis in Joint University Library, Nashville, Tenn. 1949).
23. 1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104 (Gilpin ed. 1840).
24. KONKLE, op. cit. supranote 18, at 95-97.
25. SMITH, op. cit. supranote 19, at 859.
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no matter what the record may show about the circulation of Smith's
book, Adam Smith was not Hamilton's source for ideas on this important problem of the handling of public debts.
As of this date, there are many gaps in our knowledge and understanding of Hamilton. Some of these gaps will be discussed below in
rather summary fashion in order to indicate the scope of the problem.
Suffice to say, none of these historical problems are considered in any
of the books here being reviewed. In some cases, these books expressly
reject the factual material now available for a consideration of these
26
matters. Professor Hacker is the most explicit in this respect.

One historical omission which at this time cannot be avoided arises
out of the fact that in our constitutional writings there has never been
a detailed analysis of The Federalist. In his chapter devoted to the
creation of this great work, Mitchell declares that he is making no
presentation of the detailed argument. He says that The Federalist,
"inspecial fashion, speaks for itself. '27 It must be said that, as a
general principle, neither facts nor books speak for themselves. This
gap in our knowledge may be rectified by the forthcoming work on
this book by Professor Gottfried Dietze of Johns Hopkins. It is
promised for next year. A series of law review articles have raised
the hope that this book will be the first systematic analysis of the
classic.28 Madison, Jay, and Hamilton wrote it under pressure, at
top speed, and without mutual consultation. It is understandable
therefore that each revealed himself with a distinct intellectual
makeup, The study of Professor Dietze will state the premises of
each of these men.
But much unused material is available for an examination of what
has been called the "intellectual milieu" of Hamilton. While our
initial interest is in the books that Hamilton read and used, this examination will not completely satisfy. We can never know the complete
list. We therefore turn to another source for understanding the
intellectual development of a man; the study of general ideas prevailing during a man's life and his reaction to them. A splendid example of this principle can be set out by an examination of the blend
of ideas surrounding the handling of the public debt in the years following the publication of the Wealth of Nations. The central idea is
the familiar belief that what is good for a particular class of persons
is good for the country.
In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith repeatedly stated his belief
26. For example, Hacker's rejection of the work of Merrill Jensen is dis-

cussed at page 881 infra.
27. MiTcHELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 630.
28. Dietze, Hamilton'sFederalist-Treatisefor Free Government, 42 CORNELL
L.Q. 307, 501 (1957); Dietze, Jay's Federalist-Treatisefor Free Government,
17 Mi. L. REv. 217 (1957); Dietze, Madison's Federalist-A Treatise for Free
Government, 46 GEo. L.J. 21 (1957).
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in the general economic benefits arising out of the unfettered operation
of man's self interest. An individual is the best judge of his own interest and by constantly working to promote these interests, an individual is "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
29
part of his intention."
Whatever the origin of this doctrine, it is clear that when Smith
wrote, this idea of the larger significance of self-love was already in
the current of thought and had become a widely accepted principle.
For instance, in January of 1777, Robert Morris was writing that no
official encouragement or regulation of commerce was necessary. The
enterprising spirit of American traders accounted for the prevalent
prosperity because "their own interest and the publick good goes hand
in hand."30 This principle of the economic beneficience of self-love
Morris then applied to American finance.
Early in 1780, Alexander Hamilton sent an undated and unsigned
letter to Robert Morris, then a member of Congress. This letter was
a lengthy review of the depressed state of public affairs and the
financial requirements for improving this situation. After this review,
he stated:
The only plan that can preserve the currency, is one that will make it
the immediate interest of the moneyed men to co-operate with Government in its support. This country is in the same predicament in which
France was previous to the famous Mississippi scheme, projected by Mr.
Law.... Mr. Law, who had much more penetration than integrity, readily
perceived, that no plan could succeed which did not unite the interest and
credit of rich individuals with those of the State; and upon this, he
framed the idea of his project, which so far, agreed in principle with the
Bank of England. 31
Hamilton then proposed the establishment of a bank which with
private money would fund the public debt.
In the spring of 1781, Robert Morris was nominated for the position
of Superintendent of Finance. On April 30, Hamilton wrote him a long
letter of congratulation. In this letter, he again reviewed the situation
of the Government and repeated his proposals. The essential accomplishment must be to interest moneyed people by providing:
A plan which will give them the greatest security the nature of the case
will admit for what they lend; and which will not only advance their own
interest, and secure the independence of their country, but, in its progress,
29. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 19, at 423. This doctrine has a long history.
See Chalk, Natural Law and the Rise of Economic Individualism in England,
59 J. POL. EcoN. 332 (1951). LASKI, THE RISE OF LIBERALISM; THE PILOSOPHY
OF A BusINEss CIVILIZATION (1936).
30. VERSTEEG, ROBERT MORRIs, REVOLUTIONARY FINANCIER 38 (1954).
31. 1 WORKS OF HAMILTON 125 (Hamilton ed. 1851). See also Hamilton to

James Duane, Sept. 3, 1780 (id. at 164). "The interest of active men in a
state is a foundation perpetual and infallible." Burke, Causes of the Present Discontents, 1 WORKs OF BURKE 357 (1839).
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have the most beneficial influence upon its future commerce, and be a
source of national strength and wealth. 32
Again, Hamilton had in mind the establishment of a National Bank.
A bank would issue stock that could be paid for, at least in part, by
public debt certificates. The moneyed classes would be the chief
owners of these certificates. The Bank could float loans to both the
Government and individuals. This organization of the public finances
would presumably encourage the orderly retirement of the national
debt. By thus making it profitable to handle the public funds, Hamilton thought it reasonable to say:
A national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing.
33
It will be a powerful cement of our union.
Morris thanked Hamilton for his letter,34 with remarks that showed
that the two were in complete understanding. Several months later, in
July, Morris wrote to Benjamin Franklin, then in New York, that it
was his intention to propose the establishment of a national bank
which would become
a principal pillar of American credit, so as to obtain the money of individuals for the benefit of the Union, and thereby bind those individuals
more strongly to the general cause by ties of private interest.
On the same day, Morris wrote to John Jay that the bank would
serve
to unite the several states more closely together in one general money
connexion, and indissolubly to attach many powerful individuals to the
cause of our country by the strong principle of self-love and the immediate sense of private interest.35
Acting on these principles, Morris, in two reports to Congress on
public credit 36 proposed a national bank, the funding of the public
debt, and even a limited assumption of the state debts. In April of
1782, he wrote that "a public debt, supported by public revenue, will
prove the strongest cement to keep our confederacy together." 37
His words were echoed by James Wilson of Pennsylvania who had
participated in the founding of the Bank of North America in 1781.
Elected to Congress in 1782, in January of 1783, during a speech on
finances, Wilson remarked that:
A public debt, resting on general, funds would operate as a cement to
the Confederacy. 38
32. Id. at 236.
33. Id. at 257.
34. Id. at 264.
35. Both quotations are from VERSTEEG, op. cit. supra note 30, at 67 (1954).
36. Nov., 1781 and July 29, 1782.
37. VERSTEEG, op. cit. supra note 30, at 129.
38. 1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADIsoN 284 (Gilpin ed. 1840). Two days later, Wil-
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Prior to this debate, in November of 1782, James Madison had supported a proposal that commissioners, appointed by Congress, should
travel the country to settle government accounts. They should be
empowered to buy up old money at fixed discounts and pay with new
certificates. He said that such actions "would multiply the advocates
for federal funds for discharging the public debts, and tend to cement
the union."39
During this period Hamilton continued to stress the significance
of enlisting the personal interests of the moneyed people in supporting
the government. Madison reports that on February 23, 1183, "Mr.
Hamilton enlarged on the general utility of permanent funds to the
'40
federal interests of this country.
At this period in our history, only one voice has been found which
was raised against the principle of funding the public debt. Madison
reported the words of "Mr. Mercer" [John Mercer of Virginia] on
February 18, 1783:
He said that it had been alleged, that the large public debt, if funded
under Congress, would be a cement of the Confederacy. He thought, on
the contrary, it would hasten its dissolution; as the people would feel its
41
weight in the most obnoxious of all forms, that of taxation.
And on February 27th, Mr. Mercer was truly prophetic in his
language when he said that the funding of debts tended
to establish and perpetuate a moneyed interest in the United States;
that this moneyed interest would gain the ascendance of the landed
interest; would resort to places of luxury and splendor, and, by their
42
example and influence, become dangerous to our republican constitutions.
But Mercer, of course, had no general influence. Hamilton continued to adhere to these views and we find them again in his reports to Congress. In his first report on the Public Credit in January
of 1790 he said:
If all the public creditors receive their dues from one source . . . their
interest will be the same. And, having the same interests, they will unite
in the support of the fiscal arrangements of the Government . .. .43
In March of 1790, Oliver Wolcott, then Hamilton's assistant in the
Treasury Department wrote to his father as follows:
I can consider a funding system as important, in no other way than as
an engine of government .... The influence of a clergy, nobility and
son again remarked that a funding of the common debt "would produce a
salutary invigoration and cement to the union." Id. at 290.
39. Id. at 209.
40. Id. at 357.
41. Id. at 340.
42. Id. at 365.

43.

NANCE

ALEXANDER HAMILTON'S PAPERS ON PUBLIC CREDIT, COMMERCE, AND

17 (McKee ed. 1957).

FI-
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armies, are and ought to be out of the question in this country; but unless some active principle of the human mind can be interested in support
of the government, no civil establishments can be formed, which will
not appear like useless and expensive establishments ....
For these reasons I think the State debts ought to be assumed, as without
the assumption the political purposes which I have enumerated, cannot
be attained. This will indeed increase the debt in the United States, to a
degree which will be very inconvenient. The taxes necessary to pay
the interest will be burdensome, and they will appear to be just, only to
those who believe that the good attained is more important than the
evil which is suffered. 44
The principle of self-love having a public significance led to the
use of the public debt to induce the moneyed class to support the new
nation. Once established, the now funded debt and the new bank were
to be used as the instruments by which the men so induced would exert
their influence and maintain their power. The public debt was to be
the bait. If swallowed, it would become the cement of the Union.
This line of reasoning had been generally recognized in England for
well over 100 years. As was noted previously there is a striking parallel between Hamilton's financial plans and the history of the Bank
of England. The London merchants were the original supporters of
the Bank in 1694. By committing their resources to this Bank, they
tied their fortunes to William and the Protestant succession. This
connection between the moneyed men and public credit was so obvious
that in an allegory in one of the papers in The Spectator, written in
1710, Joseph Addison described the enemies of Public Credit as Tyr45
anny, Anarchy, Atheism, and the pretender, young James Stewart.
In one of Jonathan Swift's papers he described the Bank of England
46
as a Protestant Bank.
This previous discussion has demonstrated the existence of a
general ethical principle believed in by many and its application to
a very practical political and economic problem. One of the most
interesting aspects of this example has been the appearance of
identical wording in discussion about public debts. No biographer
of Hamilton that I have seen has related this general principle nor
its practical corollary to Hamilton's work as Secretary of the Treasury.
The inference has been left by these biographers that Hamilton invented these financial solutions, that they prove his responsibility and
high sense of duty, that these solutions were not only the only possible
one but so good were they that they become once and for all the test
of sound public finance. Nothing could be further from the truth.
As will be shown later, there were other solutions to the financial
44. Abridged from the quotation in Charles, Hamilton and Washington: The

Origins of the American Party System, 12 Wm. & MARY

45. The Spectator (Phila.), 1832, I, 40-44.
46. 6 WORKS OF SwIFT 298 (Scott ed.).

Q., 243, 1955.
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problems of the new nation. Hamilton got his way only after a bitter
struggle, within a few years after he had left office most of his
financial program had been discarded, and finally, with the advent of
Jefferson into the Presidency, the underlying theory of Hamilton
was totally rejected.
The implications of Hamilton's program gradually came to be understood. For instance, some arrangement would have to be made to
keep the interest of this class once it was obtained. If a funded debt
was profitable, could the Government afford to pay it off? Hamilton
never faced up to this question; Jefferson did, almost from the very
beginning of his understanding of Hamilton's policies. And he began
to understand rather quickly.
Jefferson would be most likely to oppose any moral principle
founded on self-love. Just because an act was personally beneficial,
it could not be inferred that it was therefore a just act. A moral
sense was part of the natural constitution of man.4 7 And "virtue does
not consist in the act we do, but in the end it is to effect."
With this attitude, it is understandable why Jefferson would look
askance at a policy that resulted in the buying of the allegiance of a
small propertied class. He believed such a policy was wrong for a
number of reasons. First, it was not necessary to buy the support of
any class of a society. Men supported a government naturally. They
had nowhere else to go. Different interests were inevitable in any
government and to support one to the exclusion of the other was
wrong. Second, the wrong class of the new nation was being supported. The agrarian class constituted ninety percent of the population. The members of this class seem naturally favored towards a
more moral and better life. If a government were to promote any
class, the agricultural part of the community ought to be the one.
But probably the most important reason of all was the actual result
of Hamilton's policies, as Jefferson observed this result.
In August of 1791, Jefferson wrote that:
A spirit ... of gambling in our public paper has seized on too many of
our citizens, and we fear it will check our commerce, arts, manufactures,
and agriculture, unless stopped.48
Some months before this Jefferson had come to the conclusion that
Hamilton's financial system simply fostered gambling and immorality.
As noted above, he thought it caused the withdrawal of money from
useful pursuits into stock-jobbing. In order to perpetuate this ar47. 15 id. at 76. See also BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
140 (1948). "Any moral system which should attempt to ground morality on
self-interest was foredoomed to failure, in Jefferson's eyes. Self-love is no

part of morality for Jefferson; it is 'exactly its counterpart.' " KocH, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 30 (1943).
48. 8 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 230 (Bergh ed. 1903-04).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 11

rangement, it was necessary to corrupt the Congress and this had already taken place. In July of that year he told the President that
the two great complaints were that the national debt was unnecessarily
increased, & that it had furnished the means of corrupting both branches
of the legislature .... therefore it was a cause of just uneasiness when
we saw a legislature legislating for their own interests in opposition to
those of the people. He [Washington] said not a word on the corruption
of the legislature, but . . . defended the assumption ....

49

In October, Washington again discussed with Jefferson, his intention of leaving the Government. He urged Jefferson to compose his

differences with Hamilton. He thought that Jefferson was exaggerating
the anti-republican tendencies of Hamilton. Jefferson responded that
the President was underestimating the effect of Hamilton's policies
[particularly] when we saw that these measures had established corruption in the legislature, where there was a squadron devoted to the nod
of the treasury, doing whatever he had directed & ready to do what
he should direct. That if the equilibrium of the three great bodies Legislative, Executive, & judiciary could be preserved, if the Legislature could
be kept independent, I should never fear the result of such a government
but that I could not but be uneasy when I saw the Executive had swallowed
up the legislative branch.5 0
In another conversation with Washington, Jefferson made it clear
that the people he spoke for did not believe that what Hamilton was
doing was good for a very substantial part of the population.
I confirmed him in the fact of the great discontents to the South, that
they were grounded on seeing that their judgmnts & interests were sacrificed to those of the Eastern states on every occn. & their belief that
it was the effect of a corrupt squadron of voters in Congress at the
command of the Treasury, & they see that if the votes of those members
who had an interest distinct from & contrary to the general interest of
their constts [constituents] had been withdrawn, as in decency &
honesty they should have been, the laws would have been the reverse of
what they are in all the great questions.51

Certainly Jefferson was making his meaning clear. He assured
Washington that he did not publicly quarrel with Hamilton. But as for
private conversation, that was different and he freely acknowledged
his personal disapproval. 52 To support Hamilton without reservation
in the face of these opinions, is likely to lead one to the view of Hamilton's partisans that Jefferson was a cunning, hypocritical intriguer.
Professor Hacker doesn't go this far. He adopts the simple view that:
49. 1 WaRixcs or JEFFERsON 200 (Ford ed.).

50. 1 id. at 204-05.
51. 1 id. at 215-16.
52. 6 Id. at 102. THE WRITGS OF JEFFERsoN VIII, 396-97 (Bergh ed. 1903-04).

1958]

ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE HISTORIANS

867

Washington was forced to accept Hamilton's proposals because he had
no alternative; for Jefferson knew how to oppose but he did not know
53
how to act.

This is an indefensible position. It is not only improbable; it
isn't true. But it reflects one historical tradition about Hamilton
and Jefferson. It is the partisan Hamilton story. The historian should
know better. I am not sure that any of the books here being reviewed
acknowledge that Jefferson and Madison were responsible men.
If Jefferson was simply opposing Hamilton without any reasonable
proposals to substitute for those which he opposed, then he can be
called irresponsible. But he had proposals, several of them. Madison
also had ideas on what to do for the public credit. And a very large
body of men came increasingly to oppose Hamilton's proposals for
reasons both reasonable and honorable.
One famous proposal of Jefferson's was that the earth belongs to the
4
living.M
The dead have no right to bind the living. From this it
followed that no one generation should contract debts that could not
be paid off in that generation. Madison broke the news gently. It was
an unrealistic proposal.
In October of 1789, Hamilton had asked Madison to jot down any
ideas he might have on the handling of the public debt. Madison had
replied with a list of several types of taxes that might be levied. 5
Jefferson reported on George Mason's proposals for settling our
debt. 6 Mason would have levied a heavy impost which he would not
have spent for one year. During that year he would have opened
offices for registering public debt certificates by original owners. At
the end of the year he would have used the national funds to (1)
pay the civil list, (2) pay the interest on unalienated certificates, (3)
pay some principal on unalienated certificates, and (4) use any surplus to buy up alienated certificates in the open market.
No comment is necessary on the realism of this particular plan, but
it does contain the elements of the probable solution, had not Hamilton
gotten his projects through Congress. One thing is clear-nobody in
public life did not want to pay off the public debt. Everybody believed,
as did Jefferson that:
There can never be a fear but that the paper which represents the public
debt will be ever sacredly good. The public faith is bound for this, and
no change of system will ever be permitted to touch this .... 57
53. HACKEa, op. cit. supra note 9, at 201.
54. The letter was written to Madison on Sept. 6, 1789. Instead of mailing
it, Jefferson handed it to Madison on January 9, 1790. KocH, JEFFERSON AND

MADISON, THE GREAT COLLABORATION 70 (1950). BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD
OF THomAs JEFFERSON 204 (1948).
55. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE FATHER OF THE CONSTiTUTION, 1787-1800 290
(1950).
56. 1 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 202 (FORD ed.).
57. 8 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 317 (Bergh ed. 1903-04).
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Jefferson took the further view that his every word proved
that no man is more ardently intent to see the public debt soon and
sacredly paid off than I am. This exactly marks the difference between
Colonel Hamilton's views and mine, that I would wish the debt paid tomorrow; he wishes it never to be paid, but always to be a thing wherewith to corrupt and manage the Legislature. 58
If Jefferson could believe this, then we must conclude that the
conventional view of Hamilton and the public debt does not make
sense. I agree with this conclusion. The reason is that this conventional view does not accord with the facts concerning the public debt.
The facts cover a wider area than was considered by Hamilton in his
Report on the Public Credit. The conventional view seldom goes beyond the matters discussed in the Report.
It will be recalled that early in 1790 Jefferson returned from France
and took up his position as Secretary of State. He had, up to this time,
never been particularly interested in problems of public finance.
Jefferson's letters in the early months of the administratiqn simply report the progress of Hamilton's program through Congress.
For the first few months, Jefferson was busy with his own affairs.
He merely reported to friends what was happening. There were
three major issues: (1) the funding of the debt contracted by Congress, (2) the amount of payment to be made to holders of the debt
whether they be original holders or subsequent purchasers for speculative purposes, and (3) the assumption by the national government of
the debts contracted by the states during the war.
Nobody questioned that the debt should be paid and that provision
should be made at once for its service and payment. Nobody doubted
that the debt owned by foreigners should be paid exactly as loaned.
There was however a dispute over discrimination among domestic
holders. Hamilton wanted no discrimination at all.59 Madison believed it possible to discriminate among the present owners of the debt
who were presumably speculators who had bought for a pittance from
the original owners. 60 If they were the original owners they should
be paid by the original terms. Hamilton said that such an arrangement
was impossible. However Pennsylvania actually made such a discrimination. 61
The biggest debate was over the assumption of the state debts.
These amounted to about $25,000,000 out of a total debt of about
58. Jefferson to Washington, Sept. 9, 1792, 8
(Bergh ed. 1903-04).

WITINGs OF JEFFERSON

59. HAMILTON'S PAPERS ON PUBLIC CREDIT, COMMERCE, AND

FINANCE

401
10

(McKee ed. 1957).
60. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800 at
293 (1950).
61. Charles, supra note 44, at 231. Jensen believes discrimination would
have been practical. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION 390 n.41 (1950).
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$75,000,000.62 But these state debts were not distributed uniformly
throughout the states. However they may have been contracted, the
evidences of these debts were now in the hands of the Eastern moneyed
men. Further, the various states had not acted uniformly in the repayment of these debts. Some states had made no effort at all to
provide payment; others, had made valiant and successful efforts to
reduce their indebtedness. 63 Now Hamilton was proposing a uniform
taxation to provide for these assumed debts. This would be, in effect,
a double taxation for those who had put their house in order.
So strong was the feeling about assumption that Jefferson and
others feared that if some compromise was not arrived at, there would
be no provision made at all for the public debt. Jefferson's letters
reflect various suggested compromises. The government should assume
from the states what they had already paid off.64 As early as June 20,
he mentioned the suggestion that a central location for the capital
would be a price for southern votes for assumption. Another proposal
was to assume a fixed amount, alloting to each state a portion according to its population. Jefferson also alluded to the quite prevalent
feeling that
the States could much more conveniently levy taxes themselves to pay
6
off these [debts].i5
Sometime early in July of 1790, Jefferson gave his famous dinner
attended by Hamilton, Madison and a few others. At this dinner the
agreement was made to support complete assumption in return for the
ultimate removal of the nation's capital to Georgetown on the Potomac
66
River.
This represented the complete success of Hamilton's plan. All the
public debt was now to be paid by one source. Moneyed men should
now look to and support the one national government. The point I
wish to stress is that Hamilton's biographers do not make clear that
Hamilton's financial policies were essential only because of his belief
in the necessity of pecuniarily binding the moneyed class to the government. If Hamilton had not insisted that the moneyed class be
bound by profit to the national government, there were several alternative and just solutions for handling the national debt.
One of the most interesting items of untapped historical material
is Hamilton's major speech in the constitutional convention in Phila-•

62. HAMILTON'S PAPERS ON PUBLIC CREDIT, COMMERCE, AND FINANCE 24

(McKee ed. 1957).
63. For the various state efforts and the many considerations that were
ignored by Hamilton, see JENSEN, THE NEW NATION 382 (1950). Also Charles,
supra note 44, at 229.
64. 8 WRITINGs OF JEFFERSON, 36 (Bergh ed. 1903-04)

65. 8 id. at 47-48.

66. 1 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 162-64 (Ford ed.).

regretted his part in this arrangement.

(June 13, 1790).
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delphia on June 18, 1787. On that day he arose to make his one big
effort to influence the delegates. He expressed reasons for his previous
modesty and then launched into a statement of his principles of
government. Following that, he suggested a framework of government
to fit these principles. The speech was "one of the most brilliant and
ineffective speeches of the convention.167 As Dr. Johnson of Connecticut said: "The Gentleman from N. York is praised by all, but
'68
supported by no Gentleman.
This speech 69 embodied (1) a statement of Hamilton's political
philosophy, (2) his understanding of the workings of the British Government, and (3) an apparently complete misunderstanding on the
part of Hamilton of the temper of the delegates at this convention.
A discussion of Hamilton's political principles is not within the
scope of this review. That subject is still an open one for historical
study. The writings thus far cancel out each other. Nor shall I
consider why Hamilton chose to advocate the abolition of the state
governments. This review is necessarily limited to a discussion of
the historical problems arising out of Hamilton's statements concerning the British Constitution. This speech, so far as I have discovered,
has never been subjected to any critical study by any biographer
of Hamilton. Both Hamilton and Professor Hacker deny that Hamilton ever desired a monarchy in America.7 0 None of Hamilton's contemporaries ever doubted that the British Constitution represented
Hamilton's ideal and that he tried to practice the principles he believed this ideal represented.
Hamilton adhered to a particular version of the British Constitution.
His conception of the structure of the British Government was erroneous in theory and in fact. But this particular belief fitted in well
with his more general views of how to build the new nation, This
means that he had a great many colleagues who thought as he did.
And, as might be expected, Jefferson thought that Hamilton's views
on the British Government proved that "Hamilton was not only a
7
monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed on corruption." ' So
once again we come up against the fact that our recorded history is
in truth a selection from among opposing and partisan positions. This
particular story is an interesting one.
In casting about for an appropriate form of government for this
67.

BRANT, op. cit. supra note 60, at 72.
68. Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American

States, 1927 H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 862 (1929).
69. This was the best reported speech of the Convention. We have three
accounts of it. Madison says that Hamilton read and approved of Madison's
statement of it. Id. at 225 n.61. But see doubts on this in CROSSKEY,POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1255 n.2 (1953).

70. HAcKER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 113.
71. 1 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 165 (Ford ed.).

1958]

ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE HISTORIANS

871

new nation, Hamilton stated that he had no scruple in advocating the
British Government as the best in the world. This type of government
had just what the experience of the Confederation showed was needed.
The British Government united public strength with individual security.
Every community had its sharp class divisions. There were always
the few and the many, the rich and well-born and the masses. Each of
these classes need both protection and freedom. The proper adjustment of a balance between these classes is the basis of the excellence
of the British plan. The House of Lords represents the property owners and forms a barrier to pernicious innovation by either Crown or
Commons. The English model was the only example of a good executive. The hereditary character of the King and the size of his personal income put him above the possibility and temptation of being
corrupted from abroad or at home32
There is a beguiling simplicity to Hamilton's statement. It was
customary through the eighteenth century to extoll the virtues of the
British Constitution. It was the fashion in the pre-Revolutionary
colonies to write of the joys of being a true-born Englishman under a
Whig Constitution. As a modern historian writes:
the Colonists sang continually these major themes of Whiggery: the
English Constitution ('the best model of Government that can be framed
by Mortals'); English rights... ; balanced government; jury trial .... 73
This pride and patriotism was all to the good except that it rested
on a doubtful base. These Englishmen did not understand what had
happened to their constitution since 1689 or at least it may be said
that another version of the history of this period has prevailed.
The Glorious Revolution of 1689 had brought peace and unity to
England. By it, the Whigs were bound to the Protestant Succession.
The Tories were cut off from power by the failure of the Jacobite
rebellions of 1715 and 1745.
When Queen Anne died without issue in 1714, the succession reverted to an older branch of the Stuarts and the Hanoverians came
to the throne. It will be recalled that George I was unable to speak
English. This led to the actual administration of the Kingdom going
into the hands of his English advisors. These advisors were all Whigs
and as the ruling oligarchy, they held firmly together for over fifty
years. The greatest of these advisors was Robert Walpole who acted
as the first true prime minister from 1720 to 1742. The effect of this
Whig supremacy was to transfer actual power from the crown to the
cabinet. By 1760 the concept of cabinet responsibility was discernible.
72. The fullest text is Madison's. See H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
220-22 (1929).

73. RossiTER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIc 142-43 (1953).
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The theory was being voiced that the cabinet should have its decisions
accepted and implemented by the Commons or it should resign. The
practice of manipulating and buying elections to insure party control
was also in practice.
By 1760 this new constitutional development was proceeding into
its modern form. In that fatal year, George III came to the throne.
This young man had been prepared for his Kingship. He brought to it
a set of principles-but they were a peculiar set. He was to be the
Patriot King. The kingship was a trust that he held for all the people.
He became personally responsible for a good government. To accomplish this end he must surround himself with the best available men
regardless of party. Party was a political evil. The Patriot King must
avoid association with all political faction.74
The personal government of George III, the "system of George III,"
was a complete failure. It can be demonstrated that in the twenty-five
years after 1760, there was, contrary to Hamilton, neither public
strength nor individual liberty. In 1759, English victories were celebrated in every corner of the globe-Canada, Africa, India, the West
Indies. Twenty-five years later the greatest prize of all, the American
colonies, was lost.
In domestic affairs, the period had been one of never ending turmoil.
One thread of the trouble began in 1763 with the arrest of John Wilkes
for seditious libel.75 As punishment, the King used his influence to
deprive Wilkes of his Parliamentary seat. As often as his constituents
returned him, his election was voided. By 1770, writers were recognizing the constitutional changes involved in the personal government
of the King.
In Letter 39, dated May 28, 1770, Junius stated:
In other times, the interest of the King and people of England was, as it
ought to be, entirely the same. A new system has not only been adopted
in fact, but professed upon principle. Ministers are no longer the public
servants of the state, but the private domestics of the Sovereign. One
particular class of men are permitted to call themselves the King's
friends, as if the body of the people were the King's enemies7 6
The "King's friends" prompted Edmund Burke in 1770 to write one

of his greatest works, The Causes of the Present Discontents. The
object of this work was to determine the cause of the increasing power
of the crown under the name of influence. This had been achieved by
separating the King from his ministers and by giving him advisors who
74. These ideas had their most notable expression in BoLINGBRoKE, THE
2 WORKS OF BOLINGBROKE 376 (1841). Edmund Burke
in 1790 queried: "Who now reads Bolingbroke? Who ever read him through?"
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 130 (Gateway ed. 1955).
75. Case of John Wilkes, 19 How. S. Tr. 981 (C.P. 1763).
76. LETTERS OF JUNIUS 173 (Everett ed.). Hamilton quotes from Junius in
PATRIOT KING (1831).

The Federalist. MoRIus, op. cit. supra note 11, at 185.
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had no cabinet responsibility.
Burke had seen a course of British constitutional development at
complete variance with that reported by Hamilton.77 The British
polity could not be dependent upon the intrigues of a court. It must
be based upon principle. In political life, party represents principle.
Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors

the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are
all agreed.?8
Today we regard Burke's pamphlet on the Causes of the Present
Discontents as a most important document. Unfortunately, we can
say, as Burke did: "Who read it?" Hamilton knew of Burke's speeches
on American questions.79 Burke had been the agent of the New York
colony to the court of Great Britain from 1771-1775.80 Thomas Jefferson was aware of Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France.81
But there is nothing in between. No one mentioned Burke at the
28
constitutional convention.
These theoretical writings should have made some mark on the
colonists. I have never seen any reference to any of them. But I do
not think that Americans were also ignorant of the actual happenings
in England.
In addition to the Wilkes affair and the scandals of the Middlesex
elections, there were various incidents in and out of Parliament that
reflected a deep dissatisfaction with the British Constitution in its own
home.
Edmund Burke throughout the early 1780s was attempting to secure
legislation that would limit and regulate the civil list-the appropriation for the Royal household. Burke's ultimate success has been
described as
probably the most important single act of reform achieved in England
in the eighteenth century. 3
77. D. W. Brogan, the English analyst has written of the young Hamilton
and "his admiration for the English constitution, which he adored with an
uncritical fervour that would have astounded Burke." BROGAN, POLITICS IN
AMERICA 23 (1954). This is not an entirely settled point. See, e.g., Beer, The
Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background, 51
Am. POL. SC. REV. 613 (1957).
78. 1 WORKS OF BURKE 425 (1839). The nature of George III's personal
government is given in detail in NAMIER, ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1930). Namier denies the factual basis of Burke's argument. See

also Holdsworth, The Conventions of the Eighteenth Century Constitution, 17
IOWA L. REV.161 (1932).
79. 2 WORKS OF HAMILTON 93 (Hamilton ed. 1851).
80. HOFFMAN, EDMUND BURKE, NEW YORK AGENT, WITH HIS LETTERS TO THE

NEW YORK ASSEMBLY AND INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH CHARLES O'HARA,

1771-76 (1956).

146-82 (1949).
82. Also noted in Pargellis, The Theory of Balanced Government, in THE
CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 37, 49 (Read ed. 1938).
81. COPELAND, OUR EMINENT FRIEND, EDMUND BURKE

83. COPELAND, OUR EMINENT FRIEND, EDMUND BURKE 164 (1949).
Economical Reform, 1779-1787, 50 L.Q. REV. 368 (1934).
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Thoroughgoing Parliamentary reform, that is, a wider base for the
electorate, was decades away. One may be assured that Hamilton
would have been opposed to such reforms. Jefferson relates a conversation about the British Constitution in which Hamilton asserted
that if the British government were to be purged of its corruption
and its popular branch [Commons] were to be given equality of
representation, "it would become an impracticable government' '"
But there was a rumbling among the disenfranchised masses that
made itself felt within Parliament. For instance in June of 1779, a
mild bill for the relief of Catholics touched off the Gordon Riots that
raged through London for a week.
In the provinces, the extra-parliamentary device of the petition
was developed. An early objective was to protest the waste of funds.
Starting with such a relatively harmless aim, local meetings and
petitions were responsible for the astounding result of the Dunning
Resolution.
On April 6, 1780, John Dunning introduced into the Commons a
resolution which read as follows:
That it is the opinion of this committee that the influence of the Crown
has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.85

The resolution carried, 233 to 215. The authority on this period,
Professor Butterfield of Cambridge University, concludes that:
No matter what interpretation we may adopt . . . it is difficult to see

how Dunning's motion could have carried if many honest supporters of
George III had not had genuine misgivings concerning his increasing in-

fluence. 86

Surely this resolution and the events that brought it on were
known to some of the members of the Convention. But, again, I have
seen no reference to it.
I am inclined to regard as unmined historical material the differences
in the understanding about the British Constitution that was exhibited
by the delegates to the constitutional convenion. 87 Suffice it to say
that these differences in understanding were used for very practical
purposes.
The significance of this knowledge can now be recognized when we
find Jefferson stating the intention of the opposition to Hamilton's

policies. It was
84. 1 WRTINGS OF JEFFERSON 166 (Ford ed.).
85. BUTTERFED, GEORGE III, LORD NORTH AND THE PEOPLE, 1779-80 at 315
(1949).
86. Id. at 322-23.
87. Subsequent commentators tend to underrate the knowledge exhibited.

They blame this on Blackstone from whom our early statesmen drew their
learning. For instance, see FIsKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
1783-1789, 289 (1898).
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to preserve the legislature pure and independent of the Executive, to
restrain the administration to republican forms and principles, and not
permit the constitution to be construed into a monarchy, and to be
warped in practice into all the principles and pollutions of their favorite
English model.8 8
A final example will now be given of the type of historical situation
that biographers of Hamilton have not subjected to critical analysis.
Once again, the views of Jefferson will be set forth to show a
very pointed difference of view which has not been reflected, acknowledged, or recognized in the subsequent writings on Hamilton.
Broadus Mitchell has undertaken to let the facts fall where they may
in his biography. As an example of letting the facts fall is Mitchell's
assertion that the association of Hamilton and Washington "is one of
the delights in setting forth Hamilton's history."89 In this first volume
of Mitchell's biography, the major example of this "delight" is the
shabby conduct of Hamilton in resigning from his post as Washington's
aide in February of 1781. Professor Mitchell places the blame, if
any, on Hamilton. 90 He did not show the forbearance required of
his position. Hamilton felt called upon to record his position in a
long letter to his father-in-law, General Schuyler. 91 This letter revealed the fact that for three years Hamilton had felt no affection for
his superior. Washington went far beyond his duty to seek a reconciliation with this 26-year old colonel. But Hamilton was adamant.
Time and Washington's charity healed this breach.
The important historical problem is the nature of the relationship
of these two great men in the years 1789-95. Mitchell, of course, has
not yet had his say on these years but his preliminary conclusion is
that the relation is a delight to consider. There is some dissent from
this view based on evidence not usually mentioned by Hamilton
partisans. Dumas Malone speaks of "the aging Washington, who was
more a prisoner of the Federalists than most historians are willing to
admit."'92 John DosPassos accepts this view 93 and refers to the extensive evidence recorded by Jefferson of Washington's "early senility." If one person can speak of the delightful relationship between
Washington and Hamilton and another can refer to a senile Washington as Hamilton's captive, then the historian should at least acknowledge the existence of irreconcilable points of view.
Jefferson always maintained that Washington never understood
88. 1 WnR=mIs or JEFFERSON 165 (Ford ed.).
89. MiTcHELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at X.
90. Id. at 230-31. SCHACHNER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 128, regards the break
as a result of months of deliberation on Hamilton's part.
91. 1 WoRKs OF HAMILTON 211 (Hamilton ed. 1851).

92. N.Y. Times, Book Review, Feb. 10, 1957, p. 4.
93. DosPAssos, THE MEN WHO MADE THE NATION 273 (1957).
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what Hamilton was doing. He states that after he left the cabinet
in January of 1794
the federalists got unchecked hold of Genl. Washington. His memory
was already sensibly impaired by age, the firm tone of mind for which
he had been remarkable, was beginning to relax, it's energy was abated;
a listlessness of labor, a desire for tranquillity had crept on him, and a
willingness to let others act and even think for him. 94
In a record of a prolonged conversation with Washington on February 29, 1792, Jefferson states that the President told him
that he really felt himself growing old, his bodily health less firm, his
memory, always bad, becoming worse, and perhaps the other faculties
of his mind showing a decay to others of which he was insensible himself, that this apprehension particularly oppressed him, that he found
moreover his activity lessened, business therefore more irksome, and
tranquility & retirement become an irresistible passion. 95
In July of 1793, Genet, the French Minister to this country wrote
back to France that Jefferson had told him that:
Senator Morris and the Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton . . . exerted

the greatest influence on the mind of the President, and it was only with
the greatest difficulty that he counteracted their efforts.9 6
A more recent student of this period ascribes Hamilton's influence
from 1789 to 1801 "primarily because of his standing with Washington." 97 This writer's research into the origin of the party system
in this country reveals it at the point when Jefferson has withdrawn
from the cabinet and the interests that Jefferson represented no
longer had a voice in court. Washington found political faction repellent and thought that the country could do without such devices.
This attitude draws the conclusion from Joseph Charles that Wash-

ington
is to be blamed, not for allying himself with a party, but for not knowing that he had done so, and for denouncing those opposed to his party as
opposed to the government.98
Hamilton's death in 1804 was not, in an historical sense, untimely.
By this time, his political support was virtually gone. The Adams
agrarians had gone over to Jefferson 99 and the base of the Federalist
party had begun to narrow to the point that led to its extinction in
1816.
94. 1 WRTnNGs OF JEFFERSON 168 (Ford ed.).
95. 1 id. at 175. A similar conversation took place on July 10, 1792, 1 id.
at 198, Oct. 1, 1 id. at 202, and Feb. 7, 1793, 1 id. at 214.
96. 1 id. at 246.
97. Charles, supra note 44, at 251.
98. Id. at 258.
99. DAUER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS 263 (1953).
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Hamilton's wonderful powers might have prolonged the struggle.
He was a host in himself. But the effort would have been ignoble.
Hamilton's last ten years were not those of an ascending star. 0
Social forces had moved in other directions. He could not have combatted them successfully, but he would have tried. In the midst
of the battle, his expedients would have become increasingly desperate.
Imagine Hamilton at the Hartford Convention in 1814! So far as I am
concerned, Hamilton is worthy of study only up to and including
January 31, 1795.101 Accordingly, there is no discussion in this review of Hamilton's activities subsequent to this date.
If Hamilton had been willing, he could certainly have made himself one of the most dominating figures ever to practice before the
New York Bar. He could have made a tremendous fortune for his
family. But his chief ambition apparently was to influence the course
of his nation's history. And this after 1795, he was no longer able to
do. He would not recognize this and transfer his energies into other
channels.
None of this previous discussion is intended to, nor is it likely
to, lessen the stature of Hamilton. The criticism expressed in this
review has been directed only at the historical scholarship concerning Hamilton. No evaluation has been made of the respective views
stated by Hamilton and Jefferson. It has been deemed sufficient to
argue that at least a statement of the differences is required for an
adequate portrayal of Hamilton. But it should be emphasized that
Hamilton's place in history does not depend on what we know about
him. A realistic understanding of his problems and solutions would
help, but he has done his work.
Hamilton dominated the American Government from 1790 to 1795.102
103
His administrative genius set the tone of the new government.
100. "Hamilton's more discriminating biographers obviously have felt, in
contrast with the usual piously patriotic lament over his short career, that
their task would have been a more grateful one if they could have ignored
the years between his resignation in 1795 and his death in 1804. And certainly
there was little in these years to magnify his reputation." Tugwell & Dorfman,
Alexander Hamilton: Nation-Maker, 30 COL. U.Q. 59, 66 (1938).
101. "His fellow countrymen, had seen enough of Hamilton by 1795." Id.

at 59. 'y 1795 Hamilton realized with bitterness that his great services to
the nation as Secretary of Treasury were not going to win him the reward
he wished [the Presidency]." A Note on Certain of Hamilton's Pseudonyms,
12 WM. & MARY Q. 294 (1955). See also Wright, Alexander Hamilton, Founding
Father,7 I-11STORY TODAY 182, 183 (1957).
102. This was Jefferson's constant complaint. 1 WRITINGs oF JEFFERSON 174

(Ford ed.), and was the most important reason for his resignation from the
cabinet effective January 1, 1794. The 1791 budget asked for $57,000 for the
Treasury, $6500 for the War Department and $6200 for the State Department.
DosPAssos, THE MEN WHO MADE THE NATION 239 (1957).
103. "Hamilton was one of the great administrators of all time." WHITE, THE
FEDERALISTS,

A STUDY IN ADINISTRATIVE

HISTORY

126 (1948).

This work is a

detailed account of the setting up of the new government by the Federalists.
"Hamilton was the greatest administrative genius America has produced."
MORRIS, op. cit. supra note 11, at viii.
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There was a responsible government when he was finished.lC4 Wash-

ington confirmed all his actions. Jefferson was unable to stand up
to him in these early years. All others in the executive department3
were his colleagues.
It is of historical interest only to wonder today about the consequences of alternative courses of action. What was done was done

successfully. A strong government was born. The tremendous expansion of modern government makes it unlikely that any man could
today affect the administration and policies of other departments as
Hamilton did. No other figure in our history of such power and influence comes to mind. Such people are probably pretty hard to contain,
but they make history. He was, in truth, "a nation-maker." The argument should be noted that there were other ways of making the same
nation, but it was probably easier for Jefferson to redirect certain
trends already set in motion by Hamilton.
Thus far we have been concerned with historical issues that have
been discussed either not at all or only partially in any of the biographies of Hamilton. These are real historical problems and merit
development. But we must accept what we have and proceed from
there. Hence, a discussion of the new books on Hamilton now must
receive our attention.
Broadus Mitchell's work is, I believe, the best biography of Hamilton now available. 0 5 Volume II, due next year, will complete Hamilton's life and we shall then have to wait for a better one. But a better one there has to be. The defect of Mitchell's work is not in his
execution of the narrative but in his conception of history and biography. These are his words:
A word as to the method of this book. A biographer . . .must be often
in doubt how far, and how frequently, to supplement recital with reflection on the meaning of an incident. Some interpretation is proper, as
the materials exhibited are necessarily partial. Generally . . . the facts

have been allowed to speak for themselves, as the best means of avoiding bias.106

104. "The true ground of Hamilton's great reputation is to be found in
the mass and variety of legislation and organization which characterized the
first administration of Washington, and which were permeated and controlled
by Hamilton's spirit. That this work was not wholly his own is of small
consequence. Whoever did it was acting under his leadership, was guided
consciously or unconsciously by his influence, was inspired by the activity
which centred in his department, and sooner or later the work was subject
to his approval. The results-legislative and administrative-were stupendous
and can never be repeated. A government is organized once for all, and
until that of the United States fairly goes to pieces no man can do more than
alter or improve the work accomplished by Hamilton and his party." ADAMS,
THE LIFE OF ALBERT GALLATin 268 (1879).
105. MITCHELL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, YOUTH TO MATURITY, 1755-1788 (1957).
106. Id. at XVI.
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Facts do not speak for themselves. 0 7 They must be guided by and,
in turn, will support principles and conclusions. If taking a position
or stating a belief as to what happened is bias then we must have it.
Faced, as he usually is, with only a part of the evidence, the biographer
must constantly make judgments. His overall accomplishment will be
evaluated by the judiciousness of his selected conclusions. In the case
of our founding fathers, one soon finds that they were men who made
character judgments of really astonishing violence. Jefferson was
firmly convinced that Hamilton admired and fostered corruption
throughout the Government. Hamilton apparently regarded Jefferson
with contempt for his alleged softheadness and womanishness. Their
respective partisans showed no restraint in abusing one another. In
this morass, a fact just doesn't fall. It has to be evaluated and placed
into a prepared position. An example of Mitchell's conclusion from
the "facts" was his previously considered account of the relationship
between Hamilton and Washington.
Mitchell has decided to enter the Jefferson-Hamilton controversy
by saying that "Jefferson stood for rights, Hamilton for responsibility."'108
If this antithesis is factual, what is the evidence? If it represents a
traditional belief, one should simply remark that it is error. Was
Jefferson irresponsible? This point was considered above when it
was noted that Professor Hacker concluded that Jefferson had no
idea what to do about the new nation and that Hamilton boldly stepped
into a vacuum. Such premises are not responsible ones; nor are they
usually much attended to in the actual writings of the historians who
announce such principles.
With these rather basic reservations, it will be of interest to see
how Mitchell faces the problem of the 1790s.
Nathan Schachner's biography was first published in 1946 and is
now reissued. 0 9 It is a lively narrative that discusses none of the
problems previously raised in this review. It goes in for the drama
of Hamilton's life and makes the most of such incidents as Hamilton's
break with Washington in 1781 and the Mrs. Reynolds episode.
Some mention should be made of this latter incident. It calls for
charity. Hamilton, like many another husband, was "baching" it in the
summer of 1791 when one day a handsome woman presented herself
107. "It is not sin in a historian to introduce personal bias that can be recognized and discounted. The sin in historical composition is the organisation
of the story in such a way that bias cannot be recognized, and the reader is
locked along with the writer in what is really a treacherous argument in a
circle. It is to abstract events from their context and set them up in implied
comparison with the present day, and then to pretend that by this 'the facts'
are being allowed to 'speak for themselves.'" BuTTEnFIELD, THE WHIG

PRETATION OF HISTORY 105 (1950).
108. MITCHELL, op. cit. supra note 105, at ix.
109. SCHACHNER, ALEXANDER HAMLnTON (1957).
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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11

to him asking for aid. She was Mrs. Reynolds and she needed money.
That night Hamilton himself took the money to her and while discussing the matter in-of all places-her bedroom, he discovered, as
110
he said, "that other than pecuniary consolation would be acceptable."
Hamilton relaxed that summer to such delights, until a Mr. Reynolds
appeared on the scene. What followed was blackmail, public scandal,
and a bold public confession of the whole affair. A mess like this has
appeared in the lives of many lesser men than Hamilton-but few
greater ones.
It is an essay using
Louis Hacker's book is not a biography.'
the facts of Hamilton's life as a basis for a polemic about lessons
we should learn from history, the underlying principle being that we
ought to return to "the Founding Fathers for Wisdom and Inspiration."
We all know that our orators return to the Founding Fathers for
nourishment, but professional historians usually avoid the practice.
It takes considerable pains to make sure that two events widely separated in time are really pertinent to one another. The attempt to
prove the pertinence usually results in distortion of the facts.
Professor Hacker's eminence in the field of history demands giving
careful consideration to his book. Two generations of students have
studied their history from his textbooks. This book does not seem to
to me to be equal to the author's reputation.
The title is Alexander Hamilton in the American Tradition. The
first question is: What is the American Tradition? For a man who has
written so extensively on this subject, Professor Hacker doesn't make
this at all clear. Perhaps this is because there isn't an American Tradition.112 There are lines of development. Our many and diverse courses
are one of the main sources of our strength. For history writing purposes, two main lines have been used. Each of us can be regarded as
either a little Jeffersonian or a little Hamiltonian. Jefferson has come
down to us as the representative of human freedom, the dignity of the
individual and his right to dissent and the wide dispersion of political
power. But "if we believe in the necessity for stable political institutions, honorable government in its relations at home and abroad,
and freedom of economic enterprise as the real key to national progress" 113 then we are supposed to be talking about Hamilton's contributions to our nation's history.
All this is certainly part of the national mythology but it is disturbing to see a professional historian perpetuating it as history. There
has been previously indicated the full extent to which Hamilton
110. Id. at 367.
111. HACKER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1957).
112. See, e.g., HACKER, THE SnAPiNG OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1947).
113. HACKER, op. cit. supranote 111, at 6.
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was consciously pursuing partisan purposes, which he confessed to.
It is difficult to explain how a supposedly irresponsible Jefferson knew
so little of what he was doing that he and his Virginia colleagues, all
Hamilton's enemies, got hold of the Government and then persuaded
the people to keep right on electing them. Finally, the conventional
view doesn't help us explain why Hamilton's party after such overwhelming initial success, just disappeared without a trace.
Hacker admits to Hamilton's failure but it isn't clear in his book
what caused it." 4 Professor Hacker's analysis makes it impossible to
understand why Hamilton met so much opposition to his policies.
This stems partially from Hacker's conscious rejection of modern
scholarship. For instance, he formally rejects the view that "the
Constitution, with its insistence upon sound money and the sanctity
of contracts, was a seizure of power in the interests of a minority."" 5
I don't know of any writer who upholds such a view.
I believe that Hacker is here mauling a strawman. He then denies,
I think, that Hamilton was deliberately working in the interests of a
minority class-the moneyed and property classes. But Hamilton himself maintained that this was just what he was doing from 1780 on.
He thought it was a good thing too. Jefferson thought it was bad.
Hacker is simply denying an admitted fact.
Another rejection of Hacker's is not only the thesis but the facts
of Merrill Jensen's The New Nation. This he does by stating that:
In recent years, Hamilton's intention has been challenged from three
different quarters. First, it is being argued-Merrill Jensen's The New
Nation is a characteristic statement-that the confederation of 1781 to
1789, rather than plunging the states into irresponsibility and chaos, was
moving -successfully toward a fusion. The Revolution, in affirming the
rights of men, was continuing toward the realization of equalitarianism:
the states were arriving at agreement on common action; the peacetime
economic processes were being reestablished and put on a firm footing.
The Constitution, because it checked the course of the Revolution and
made the states subservient to the central government was usurpation.
There was no 'critical' period; therefore, the Constitution, with its insistence upon sound money and the sanctity of contracts, was a seizure
of power in the interests of a minority.1' 6
This is all rather extravagant and for the most part begs the questions at issue, i.e. "sound money" and "sanctity of contracts." Above
all, it ex cathedra, rejects historical scholarship. Hacker says:
It is my contention, here, that not only was the Confederation inadequate
but that the Revolution was being perverted: the Constitution saved both
the American Nation and the Revolution itself.11 7
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 192-95.
Id. at viii.
Ibid.
Id. at x.
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From the use of capital letters, one can guess that we are dealing
with strong emotions. Deviation from the above "contentions" is
attributed to a "fashion among recent historians."'1 8 The best that can
be said for these "contentions" is that, if they have merit, they will
have to be fitted in and made inferable from the historical scholarship
of these recent historians. Professor Hacker's own uncritical and ambiguous assertions do not add to our knowledge or understanding of
Hamilton.
The answer to Professor Hacker is the new learning of Jensen and
others. In his preface, Jensen acknowledges the vast influence of
John Fiske's The Critical Period of American History which he states
to be "of no value as either history or example."" 9 Charles Beard is
reported by Jensen as saying that Fiske wrote the book "without
fear and without research."
Jensen concludes that:
The 'critical period' idea was the result of an uncritical acceptance of
the arguments of the victorious party in a long political battle, of a failure
to face the fact that partisan propaganda is not history but only historical
evidence.120

Jensen's book presents a magnificent opportunity for biographersthat nobody seems to be taking up. Mitchell has said of this book and
the effort it represents that:
the degree of real revision is not in proportion to the industry expended
in the fuller review of the evidence.121

I am suggesting in this review that some of the evidence is now
available and that up to now there has not been a really serious effort
at making the revision that the evidence calls for. Books continue to
be published on Hamilton that add little that is new factually and
which perpetuate the ancient misunderstandings.
The collection of writings edited by Professor Richard B. Morris is
a delight to read.1' The reading of these 600 pages will give you the
full force of Hamilton's style. Its power and persuasiveness are everywhere evident.
The editor has added commentary on Hamilton that follows the
conventional lines. We are told that we ought to consider Hamiltonian
means as well as Jeffersonian ends.123 The previous discussion should
provide a key to this exhortation. To prove that even though Hamilton
is permitted to speak for himself, you may still not know anything,
118. Id. at 74.
119. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION xii (1950).
120. Id. at 422.
121. MiTcHELL, op. cit. supra note 105, at 282.
122. MORRIS, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING
123. Id. at xiv.

OF THE NATION

(1957).
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Hamilton is quoted as considering Jefferson "a man of sublimated and
paradoxical imagination."'124 As suggested, history isn't self-evident.
However, you can best begin its study by reading the actual words
of the great man.
Pennywise, The Basic Ideas of Alexander Hamilton put out by
Cardinal Books for thirty-five cents is the best buy of all the books
here being reviewed. After an extended examination, I could discover little difference between this book and Professor Morris' larger
book reviewed above. The index and the essays introducing each
chapter were almost identical. The most obvious variation was the
shortening of chapter II which consisted of many of Hamilton's characterizations of his contemporaries. There is no index as in the larger
book. A real bedside companion.
The Alexander Hamilton Reader is an unpretentious addition to an
interesting series of paperbound books giving selection from the
writings of our leading statesmen and scholars. Over 100 pages of this
volume are taken up with extracts from The Federalist. The best
reason for examining this book is to read the complete text of the letter
of James Kent to Mrs. Hamilton. 25 This letter written in 1832 was
in answer to a series of queries addressed by Hamilton's widow to
the Chancellor. The answer was a forty-page letter giving a full
statement of Kent's knowledge and understanding of Hamilton. Kent
describes a lawyer's golden age-the summer of 1784:
At that day everything in law seemed to be new. Our judges were not
remarkable for law learning. We had no precedents of our own to guide
us. English books of practice as well as English decisions, were resorted
to and studied with the scrupulous reverence due to oracles. Nothing was
settled in our courts. Every point of practice had to be investigated,
12
and its application to our courts and institutions questioned and tested. 6
Just imagine the marvelously persuasive Hamilton moving into
this situation! In the years between 1795 and 1798, after Hamilton
had left the Treasury, the Chancellor relates that Hamilton had "an
12 7
overwhelming share" of the insurance business in New York City.
Again, this was due to the premium placed upon acuity in analyzing
the problems of this unsettled field. Kent's reputation is founded in
great measure on his erudition. He was qualified to recognize it in
another. And so he explains Hamilton's dominating position as a
lawyer.
He taught us all how to probe deeply into the hidden recesses of the
science, or to follow up principles to their far distant sources. He was
not content with the modern reports, abridgments, or translations. He
124. Id. at 521.
125. THE ALEXANDER
126. Id. at 189-90.
127. Id. at 214.
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ransacked cases and precedents to their very foundations; and we
learned from him to carry our inquiries into the commercial codes of
the nations of the European continent .... 128
Of all the books being reviewed here the one most worth reading
is the paperbound reprint of Hamilton's great papers on public
credit. 129 As has been indicated, the biographies here reviewed do
not add very much to our existing knowledge of either Hamilton or
his period. But while the general facts of Hamilton's life may be fairly
well known, his great papers are not and they are well worth studying.
This book contains the two reports on the public credit, the report on
a national bank, the report on manufactures, and, as a dividend, Hamilton's letter to George Washington on the constitutionality of a national bank. This latter letter sets forth his views on the meaning
of the general welfare clause of the constitution. This position is
the one that has prevailed in our law.130 These are really important
documents in our history and should most certainly be read and reread with care.
The selection edited by Bower Aly is an interesting collection of
paragraphs written by Hamilton and others to tell of events experienced by Hamilton.131 There are excerpts from writers contemporary
with Hamilton and of a later period, such as Charles A. Beard, expressing opinions on the life, works, and times of Hamilton. The book
moves forward in terms of Hamilton's life. And then, since the editor
is a professor of speech at the University of Missouri, there is
a chapter on Hamilton as a public speaker. This work is a very
interesting and unusual selection.
Broadus Mitchell's second book in the same year on Hamilton was
issued months after the other books in this review had been examined.
The book grew out of the Gino Speranza Lectures delivered last year
by Professor Mitchell at Columbia University. It appears that these
are not the lectures as given but that the three chapters of text were
derived from these lectures. To the text is added about sixty pages
of personal letters of Hamilton that are intended to demonstrate
various "human" traits. This is a very handsome volume and can be
recommended as a gift item.
The book reviews the work of Hamilton as a continentalist, finance
minister, and party leader. Since the title concerns itself with heritage,
there are numerous analogies between Hamilton's problems and
128. Id. at 214-15. In HORTON, JAMES KENT, A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM,
1763-1847 passim, (1939) the author asserts that Kent regarded Hamilton
as his idol and as a demigod.
129. ALEXANDER HAMILTON'S PAPERS ON PUBLIC CREDIT, COMMERCE, AND
FINANCE (McKee ed. 1957).

130. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
131. ALEXANDER HAMILTON: SELECTIONS REPRESENTING

AND

His

STYLE (Aly

ed. 1957).

HIS LIFE, HIS THOUGHT,
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those besetting us today. It should be clear by now that this reviewer
is not in sympathy with such analogies and no further comments will
be made. This book foreshadows some of the conclusions we may expect from the concluding volume of Mitchell's more formal biography.
It will be interesting to see how Mitchell develops those final years.
For, as he says:
[Hamilton's] ability to focus, to keep values in proportion, declined in
the last years. He had burned the candle at both ends. He did not practice his former self-discipline. Ironically, the age of wisdom was earlier
rather than later. Elements of extravagance entered. His animosities became untempered, embittered.132
33
Saul Padover, in his book of selections from Hamilton's writings,
had a slightly different idea of how to reveal the mind of Hamilton
than did Richard Morris. Professor Morris apparently was aiming at
completeness of coverage. He states that "for reasons of space it has
been necessary to excerpt much of Hamilton's writings.'1 34 This effort
at completeness will account for the many headings and explanatory
notes of that editor. Padover, however, goes for the long drink. He
gives in full the really important works of Hamilton. The Treasury
reports are given completely. All of Hamilton's remarks at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 are given in full as are his speeches of
the following year at the convention in New York to ratify the document. Substantial chunks of his pre-revolutionary pamphlets are
presented. A conspicuous omission appears to be Hamilton's opinion
on the constitutionality of a national bank. This opinion was set forth
in a letter dated February 23, 1791, to Washington and was in opposition to a similar letter by Jefferson. Morris gives a five page extract. 35
McKee gives the letter in full in 37 pages. 1 6 In contrast to most other
editors of Hamilton, Professor Padover omits any extracts from The
Federalist, "because it is easily available in inexpensive editions."' 137
In addition to all the documents mentioned above there are several
chapters with excerpts from Hamilton's writings dealing with his
private life and his opinions on other matters foreign and domestic.
Padover's book being almost one third smaller than that of Professor
Morris, this type of material is much scantier in Padover's book and by
so much the book suffers. The main advantage of Padover's book lies
in the giving of the full text of those writings of Hamilton that have
remained as his real contribution to American thought. With the

132. MITcHELL, HERITAGE FROM HAMILTON 92 (1957).

133. PADOVER, THE MIND OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1958).
134. MORRIS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 8.
135. Id. at 263.
136. ALEXANDER

HAMILTON'S PAPERS

ON PUBLIC CREDIT,

COMMERCE,

FINANCE 100 (McKee ed. 1957).
137. PADOVER, THE MIND OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 100 (1958).
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exception of the one letter mentioned above, Padover covers all the
material included in the work edited by McKee-and gives some substantial dividends. But it costs five times as much.
Professor Padover has considerable experience at this sort of editorial
work, having previously edited one volume collections of the writings
of Jefferson, Madison, and Washington. He is at home in this period
of our history as is shown by the introductory biographical essay.
I trust that this discussion of these books will not leave the impression that I believe that Alexander Hamilton needs a little deflating. That most certainly has not been my purpose. Hamilton was a
giant. Jefferson called him "a host in himself." His overwhelming
personality and intellect indubitably left its mark on our country.
I am suggesting, however, that we should not be too hasty to make
an historical judgment on Hamilton's policies and actions because,
as I have tried to indicate, it is not entirely certain that we really
know what he did do nor what effect he really had in his own day.

